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Message Text

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13-12
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W
---------- 063073
O R 051015Z FEB 76
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0652
INFO AMEMBASSY PRETORIA
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN

S E C R E T DAR ES SALAAM 0420

EXDIS

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O.11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TZ, AO
SUBJECT: DIALOGUE ON ANGOLA WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE

1. SUMMARY: PRESIDENT NYERERE TOLD ME FEBRUARY 4 THAT HE THOUGHT CURRENT SIGNS ON ANGOLA WERE "NOT TOO BAD." HE SAID HE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR SOLUTION WHICH WOULD INCLUDE OTHER ELEMENTS AS WELL AS MPLA IN GOVERNMENT. HE EMPHASIZED UNACCEPTABILITY CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE AT CUNENE, SAID AFRICANS WOULD NOT COMPROMISE, AND GOT ACROSS HIS SIDE OF ARGUMENT ON THIS. HE DID NOT COME UP WITH ANYTHING SIGNIFICANTLY NEW ON PROBLEM SOVIET/CUBAN PRESENCE. HE SEEMS TO BE ENJOYING "DIALOGUE ON ANGOLA" WITH U.S. END SUMMARY.

2. PRESIDENT NYERERE CALLED ME TO HIS HOUSE LATE EVENING FEBRUARY 4 FOR HOUR'S DISCUSSION TO "CONTINUE DIALOGUE ON ANGOLA." FOREIGN MINISTRY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY NYAKYI WAS ALSO PRESENT.

3. NYERERE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT CURRENT SIGNS ON ANGOLA SEEMED TO HIM TO BE "NOT TOO BAD":
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(A) CUBANS HAD VOLUNTEERED TO HIM AT ADDIS THAT THEY PREPARED

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ENCOURAGE GOVERNMENT "OF ALL PATRIOTIC FORCES" IN ANGOLA SO THAT THEY COULD GO HOME. THIS, THEY SAID, COULD INCLUDE UNITA AND CHIPENDE FORC ES.

(B) RUSSIANS THROUGH PRAVDA WERE SAYING SAME THING -- AND THIS AFTER SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD BEEN IN MOSCOW AND HAD HAD CHANCE INFLUENCE THEM.

(C) MPLA WAS DOING WELL MILITARILY AND DIPLOMATICALLY AND NYERERE NOW BELIEVES MORE THAT EVER THAT NETO PREPARED TO BE SENSIBLE, AS INDICATED RECENT REPEATED LUANDA STATEMENTS ON NON-ALIGNMENT, NO FOREIGN BASES, WELCOME FOR WESTERN INVESTMENT, AND DESIRE TALK GULF OIL.

(D) MPLA WILL HAVE OPPORTUNITY TALK TO US "WHEN U.S. SENATOR VISITS ANGOLA". NYERERE "DARED TO WONDER" IF VISIT HAD BEEN INSPIRED BY HIS OWN EARLIER SUGGESTION THAT USG SHOULD OPEN LINES TO MPLA (I PRESUME HE WAS REFERRING TO SEN. BARTLETT).

4. NYERERE WISHED US TO KNOW THAT HE WILL CONTINUE TO WORK FOR A SOLUTION IN ANGOLA. HE WILL URGE MPLA TO "ALLAY NOT COMPLETELY JUSTIFIED US FEARS OF MPLA" AND TO TAKE INTO GOVERNMENT OTHER ELEMENT S
ON SCENE. NYERERE HAD ALSO TOLD THIS TO BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER FEBRUARY 2 IN RESPONSE TO MESSAGE FROM FOREIGN SECRETARY CALLAGHAN. HOWEVER, NYERERE FORSEES PROBLEM THAT COULD BLOCK ALL EFFORTS AT SOLUTION, I.E., CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE AT CUNENE. PRETORIA GIVES TWO REASONS FOR SUCH PRESENCE, SAID NYERERE, TO PRESERVE HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT FROM DESTRUCTION AND TO COUNTER AFRICAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS. NETO WILL NOT ACCEPT COMPROMISE ON THIS. NYERERE HIMSELF CANNOT. IT WOULD MEAN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD HAVE ADDED PRECEDENT FOR BREAKING OUT AGAIN MILITARILY BEYOND ITS OWN BORDERS TO PROTECT, FOR INSTANCE, SIMILAR INTERESTS IN MOZAMBIQUE, AND TO STRIKE AT LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ANYWHERE IN AFRICA. IF SOUTH AFRICA WANTS RUSSIANS AND CUBANS TO REMAIN IN ANGOLA, THIS IS WAY TO DO IT. AFRICANS ARE SIMPLY NOT PREPARED ABANDON GUERRILLA WEAPON IF NEEDED FOR LIBERATION NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE, ALTHOUGH NYERERE STILL HOPES THESE LIBERATIONS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED PEACEFULLY.

5. PRESIDENT SAID MAIN REASON HE HAD ASKED ME TO COME IN WAS TO ANTICIPATE CUNENE PROBLEM AND TO MAKE SURE US UNDERSTOOD AFRICAN VIEWS ON IT SO THAT NETO AND OTHER AFRICANS WOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNREASONABLE IF THEIR REFUSAL COMPROMISE ON CUNENE BLOCKED SOLU-
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TION AT LAST MOMENT. HE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT SAY "BE REASONABLE" TO NETO ON THIS POINT AS HE CAN AND HAS DONE ON MANY OTHERS. HE HAD EXPLAINED CUNENE ISSUE TO BRITISH HIGH COMMISSIONER, BUT HIGH COMMISSIONER SEEMED TO THINK THAT CUNENE TOO COULD BE NEGOTIATED. IT COULD NOT.

6. I THANKED PRESIDENT FOR SHARING HIS THOUGHTS WITH US AND SAID I WOULD REPORT THEM. I DIDN'T KNOW PURPOSE OF SENATORIAL VISIT

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TO ANGOLA BUT I EXPECTED DEPARTMENT WOULD BECOME AWARE OF VIEWS
UPON HIS RETURN. I TOO HAD NOTED RECENT MPLA STATEMENTS ON NON-
ALIGNMENT, ETC., BUT AS FAR AS I KNEW THERE STILL HAD BEEN NO PROGRES
S
ON MORE IMPORTANT QUESTION OF WITHDRAWAL SOVIET AND CUBAN TROOPS.
I COULD UNDERSTAND REASONS PRESIDENT GAVE FOR CONCERN NETO AND OTHER
AFRICANS OVER CONTINUED SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE CUNENE AND THEIR
UNWILLINGNESS COMPROMISE ON ISSUE. I THOUGHT PRESIDENT WAS FAR-
SIGHTED TO ANTICIPATE THIS ASPECT ANGOLA PROBLEM. I COULD ALSO SEE
WHY BRITIH HIGH COMMISSIONER MIGHT HAVE SUGGESTED IT TOO WAS
CAPABLE OF A NEGOTIATED SOLUTION. US HAD MADE CLEAR IT HAD NO BRIEF
FOR SOUTH AFRICAN PRESENCE IN ANGOLA. IF, AS WE BOTH SEEMED TO
AGREE, "ALLAYING OF FEARS" WAS IMPORTANT ELEMENT ANGOLAN SITUATION,
SPEAKING PERSONALLY, I THOUGHT THE NEED TO FIND SOME WAY OF ALLAY-
ING SOUTH AFRICAN FEARS OF DESTRUCTION IMPORTANT FACILITY AT CUNEEN
ANF OF CONTINUAL GUERRILLA PRESSURE FROM OUTSIDE THEIR BORDERS
MIGHT MERIT CONSIDERATION ALSO.

8. NYERERR QUICKLY REPLIED THAT, IF PEACEFUL SOLUTION TURNED OUT TO
BE IMPOSSIBLE, PRESENT RULERS OF NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE WOULD HAVE
AMPLE REASON TO FEAR GUERRILLA ACTIONS AIMED AT LIBERATION THESE
TERRITORIES. BUT SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF WAS DIFFERENT. THE PROBLEM
THERE WAS NOT A COLONIAL ISSUE BUT ONE OF "BAD AFRICANS" HAVING
TO BE MADE TO CHANGE THEIR BEHAVIOR. THAT WOULD PROBABLY BEST BE
DONE IN SOME OTHER WAY. AFTER A LITTLE THOUGHT, HE ADDED THAT RE
CUNENE THE ONLY THING HE COULD THINK OF RIGHT NOW WAS THAT PERHAPS
NETO COULD GIVE ASSURANCES THAT CUNENE WOULD NOT BE DESTROYED TO
THIRD PARTY WHO COULD PASS THESE ON TO SOUTH AFRICA AND INFLUENCE
ITS REACTION TO THEM. (HE CLEARLY HAD US IN MIND.) I ASKED WHY
NETO COULD NOT GIVE SUCH ASSURANCES DIRECTLY. NYERERE SAID HE THOUGHT
NETO SHOULD BE ABLE TO GIVE SOUTH AFRICA ON CUNENE AT LEAST AS MUCH
AS FRELIMO HAD GIVEN ON PARALLEL SITUATION IN MOZAMBIQUE, BUT
HE NOT SURE PRETORIA WOULD BELIEVE HIM. MAIN POINT WAS THAT COM-
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PROMISE OR EVEN TEMPORARY CONTINUATION SOTH AFRICA PRESENCE WAS
IMPOSSIBLE. HE WANTED USG TO KNOW THAT MATTER COULD TURN
OUT TO BE CRITICAL AND THOSE WORKING FOR PEACE IN ANGOLA SHOULD
NOT BE SURPRISED IF IT DOES.

9. COMMENT: MAIN PURPOSE NYERERE'S SUMMONING ME SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN
TO EMPHASIZE TO US IMPORTANCE OF CUNENE QUESTION. WHETHER HE
PLAYING ROLE AS FAR-SIGHTED STATESMAN ON HIS OWN OR REFLECTING
SPECIFIC MPLA AND AFRICAN VIEWS IS UNCLEAR. IN ANY CASE, HE WANTS
GET LEG-UP FOR HIS SIDE ON WHAT HE THINKS MAY BE CRITICAL ASPECT
OF ANGOLAN PROBLEM.

10. I AM NOT SURE THIS IS TIME TO CONVEY TO NYERERE ANY VIEWS
DEPARTMENT MAY HAVE EVOLVED ON CUNENE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, I WOULD
APPRECIATE ANY BACKGROUND OR GUIDANCE WHICH MAY BE AVAILABLE ON

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IT -- AND ON NATURE ANY US CONTACTS WITH MPLA (INCLUDING SENATORIAL
VISIT). BOTH SUBJECTS SEEM LIKELY TO COME UP AGAIN.
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